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During	 March–May	 2014,	 a	 Middle	 East	 respiratory	 syn-
drome	(MERS)	outbreak	occurred	in	Jeddah,	Saudi	Arabia,	
that included many persons who worked or received medi-
cal	treatment	at	King	Fahd	General	Hospital.	We	investigat-
ed	78	persons	who	had	laboratory-confirmed	MERS	during	
March	2–May	10	and	documented	contact	at	this	hospital.	
The	 78	 persons	 with	 MERS	 comprised	 53	 patients,	 16	
healthcare	workers,	and	9	visitors.	Among	the	53	patients,	
the most probable sites of acquisition were the emergency 
department	(22	patients),	inpatient	areas	(17),	dialysis	unit	
(11),	and	outpatient	areas	(3).	Infection	control	deficiencies	
included	 limited	 separation	 of	 suspected	 MERS	 patients,	
patient crowding, and inconsistent use of infection control 
precautions;	aggressive	improvements	in	these	deficiencies	
preceded	a	decline	in	cases.	MERS	coronavirus	transmis-
sion probably was multifocal, occurring in multiple hospital 
settings.	Continued	vigilance	and	strict	application	of	infec-
tion control precautions are necessary to prevent future 
MERS	outbreaks.
Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) corona-virus (CoV) is a new group C betacoronavirus first 
reported in a man hospitalized in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in 
June 2012 (1). In retrospect, MERS-CoV was found to have 
caused a respiratory illness cluster in April 2012 in Zarqa, 
Jordan (2). As of January 4, 2016, a total of 1,625 labora-
tory-confirmed MERS cases, 586 fatal, have been reported 
from 26 countries; >85% have been reported from Saudi 
Arabia (3). MERS-CoV infection is characterized by fever, 
cough, and dyspnea, and severity ranges from mild illness 
to acute respiratory distress, organ failure, and death; the 
case-fatality rate is ≈36% (3–7). Most documented symp-
tomatic infections have resulted from human-to-human 
transmission (6). Transmission among healthcare workers 
(HCWs), hospital inpatients, dialysis patients, and families 
has been implicated in previous clusters (2–5,8,9). MERS-
CoV, like other CoVs, is thought to spread through respira-
tory secretions; however, the precise ways the virus spreads 
are not well understood (10). The role of contact with sur-
faces contaminated by respiratory secretions (5,11,12) is 
unclear. Modeling done during other outbreaks estimated 
the incubation period to be 5.2–6.8 days (5,13,14).
During March 2014, the Saudi Arabia Ministry of 
Health (MOH) reported to the World Health Organization 
an increase in MERS cases in the Jeddah area (7). Genetic 
typing suggested this outbreak was caused by transmission 
of a single viral subtype (15); the reason for the increase 
in cases was unclear (3). Subsequent investigation showed 
that, among symptomatic patients, 21% were HCWs and 
88% of evaluable non-HCWs had exposure to healthcare 
facilities in the 14 days before illness onset (9). King Fahd 
General Hospital (KFGH), an 815-bed public hospital, 
was the primarily affected facility (15). However, multiple 
MERS patients were treated in >1 healthcare facility, and 
the number of infections attributable to transmission at 
KFGH was uncertain. MERS-CoV spread at other health-
care facilities has been documented in dialysis units (5); 
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early reports indicated that the KFGH dialysis unit might 
be the primary site of infection transmission.
Risk factors for MERS-CoV transmission at KFGH, 
and the efficacy of implemented control measures, were 
uncertain. We investigated the cluster of MERS illnesses at 
KFGH to determine the number of cases acquired at KFGH, 
identify hospital areas where transmission occurred, and 
assess the relationship between the implementation of in-
fection control precautions and MERS cases.
Methods
An assessment of the Jeddah outbreak conducted before 
our investigation at KFGH (9) produced a list of all MERS 
cases in Jeddah diagnosed by reverse transcription PCR 
(RT-PCR) conducted at the Jeddah MOH regional labo-
ratory or Jeddah-area hospitals. This list included patient 
demographics, clinical data, onset date, and exposure data 
(including exposure to healthcare facilities) (9) and was 
used to identify ill persons with exposure to KFGH.
We defined a case as RT-PCR–confirmed MERS-CoV 
infection in a symptomatic person during March 2–May 10, 
2014, who was exposed to KFGH as a HCW, patient, or 
visitor. We selected this study period to capture all persons 
with exposure to KFGH in the 14 days before illness on-
set. We categorized cases as potentially KFGH-acquired if 
affected persons had known KFGH contact before MERS 
onset and not KFGH-acquired if their first contact with 
KFGH followed MERS onset. We used KFGH electronic 
records to determine admission and discharge dates, in-
patient rooms and beds occupied, and demographics for 
emergency department (ED) patients and inpatients. We 
assumed an incubation period of 2–14 days (5) and that pa-
tients were potentially infectious for 14 days after the onset 
date. To track the source of infection in individual patients, 
we looked for instances where an infectious inpatient was 
in the same room on the same date as a susceptible patient 
during the 2–14 days before MERS onset in the susceptible 
patient. We interviewed administrative, infection control, 
and clinical personnel at KFGH to review infection control 
recommendations and conducted a facility walk-through to 
evaluate infection control measures.
Retrospective Cohort Study
To determine setting-specific MERS acquisition rates at 
KFGH, we conducted a retrospective cohort study among 
KFGH patients treated in the ED, inpatient areas, or di-
alysis unit. The cohort comprised all patients who did not 
have symptomatic MERS when first treated in 1 of these 
3 settings. For ED and inpatient areas, we counted patient-
days from the first date of treatment until MERS symptom 
onset, discharge, or study period end; for the dialysis unit, 
we estimated patient-days as explained in the Hemodialy-
sis Unit subsection. A cohort study case was defined as 
onset of RT-PCR–confirmed MERS-CoV infection with-
in 2–14 days of treatment in >1 of these 3 settings. We 
excluded 1 patient who had symptom onset the day after 
admission because the incubation period would have been 
<2 days after first exposure to KFGH. For patients treated 
in >1 of the 3 settings, we determined the most probable 
setting and week of acquisition based on the assumption 
that the incubation period followed a log-normal distribu-
tion with mean 5.2 days and SD ±1.7 days as described by 
Assiri et.al. (5) (Tables 1, 2). Other published incubation 
period estimates (mean 5.5 days, SD ±2.5 days [13]; and 
mean 6.8 days, no SD provided [14]) were used in sen-
sitivity analyses. We calculated incidence rates as cases 
per 10,000 patient-days, rate ratios, and mid–p values. To 
support these calculations, we used maximum-likelihood 
modeling to provide additional estimates of infection rates 
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Table 1. Probability	of	Middle	Eastern	respiratory syndrome 
coronavirus incubation periods,	King	Fahd	General	Hospital,	
Jeddah,	Saudi	Arabia,	March	2–May	10,	2014* 
Incubation period, d Day probability Cumulative	probability 
1 0.0010 0.0010 
2 0.0349 0.0359 
3 0.1141 0.1500 
4 0.1605 0.3105 
5 0.1600 0.4705 
6 0.1358 0.6063 
7 0.1060 0.7123 
8 0.0792 0.7916 
9 0.0578 0.8494 
10 0.0417 0.8911 
11 0.0299 0.9210 
12 0.0215 0.9425 
13 0.0154 0.9579 
14 0.0111 0.9690 
*Incubation	periods	of	1–14	days	by	using	a	log-normal distribution with 
mean	5.2	days	and	SD	1.7	days2. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Calculation	of	most	probable	setting	of	Middle	East	
respiratory syndrome coronavirus acquisition for a patient with 
onset	date	April	2,	2014,	King	Fahd	General	Hospital,	Jeddah,	
Saudi	Arabia* 
Date 
Setting	where	
treated 
Incubation 
period, d Probability 
Mar	24 ED 9† 0.0578‡ 
Mar	25 ED 8 0.0396§ 
Mar	25 Inpatient 8 0.0396§ 
Mar	26 Dialysis 7 0.0530 
Mar	26 Inpatient 7 0.0530 
Mar	27 Inpatient 6 0.1358 
Mar	28 Dialysis 5 0.0800 
Mar	29 Inpatient 5 0.0800 
Mar	29 Dialysis 4 0.0803 
Mar	29 Inpatient 4 0.0803 
Mar	30 Inpatient 3 0.1141 
*Data	are	from	patient	5	(Figure	1). The	total	probability	is	0.50	for	
inpatient,	0.21	for	the	dialysis	unit,	and	0.10	for	ED,	so	acquisition	most	
probably occurred in the inpatient areas. ED, emergency department. 
†Represents	the	incubation	period	if	date	of	disease	acquisition	was	
March	24	and	disease	onset	was	April	2. 
‡Represents	the	probability	of	an	incubation	period	of	9 days	(Table	1). 
§Patient	was	treated	in	2	settings	on	March	25,	so	probability	is	half	of	the	
probability for each setting.  
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and 95% CIs (online Technical Appendix, http://wwwnc.
cdc.gov/EID/article/22/5/15-1797-Techapp1.pdf).
Hemodialysis Unit
From dialysis unit sign-in logs, we determined the monthly 
number of patients dialyzed in each of the unit’s 4 sections. 
Assuming each patient was dialyzed 3 times per week 
(standard practice), we used a linear regression model to 
estimate the number of patients dialyzed each day. We ob-
tained dialysis dates and beds used by MERS patients from 
dialysis unit records; for days when this information was 
unavailable, we assigned the patients to the section where 
their dialysis usually occurred.
Statistical Analyses and Ethics Considerations
For statistical analyses, we used Excel (Microsoft Corpora-
tion, Redmond, WA, USA), SAS version 9.3 (SAS, Incor-
porated, Cary, NC, USA), Epi Info 7 (http://wwwn.cdc.gov/ 
epiinfo/), and OpenEpi version 3.03a (http://www.openepi.
com). This investigation was reviewed by the Centers for 
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Figure	1.	Location	of	cohort	study	patients	in	the	14	days	before	Middle	East	respiratory	syndrome	symptom	onset,	the	day	of	onset,	
and	14	days	after	onset,	King	Fahd	General	Hospital,	Jeddah,	Saudi	Arabia,	March	2–May	10,	2014.	Green	indicates	the	2–14	days	
before	symptom	onset	(susceptible	period);	red	indicates	the	day	of	onset;	gray	indicates	the	14	days	after	onset	(infectious	period).	
e,	emergency	department;	i,	inpatient	area;	b,	emergency	department	and	inpatient	areas;	*	indicates	dialysis	unit.
MERS-CoV,	Saudi	Arabia
Disease Control and Prevention and MOH and was deter-
mined to be a nonresearch public health response and not sub-
ject to Institutional Board Review.
Results
Patient Characteristics
We identified 130 symptomatic MERS patients who had 
contact with KFGH. Of these, 52 were not KFGH-acquired 
and 78 (60%) were potentially KFGH-acquired. The 78 
comprised 50 cohort study patients (i.e., treated in >1 of 
the ED, inpatient, or dialysis settings) as well as 16 HCWs, 
9 hospital visitors, and 3 outpatients (Table 3). Median age 
was lower in HCWs and visitors (both 47 years) than in 
cohort study patients (56 years).
For most of the 78 KFGH-acquired cases, illness 
onset occurred during April 4–22, 2014 (Figure 1). The 
median onset date was earlier for the 78 KFGH-acquired 
cases (April 11) than for the 52 non–KFGH-acquired cases 
(April 22). Of 16 HCWs with MERS acquired at KFGH, 
most (10 [63%]) were physicians; the proportion of physi-
cians with MERS infection was much higher (1%) than for 
other personnel categories (Table 4).
Retrospective Cohort Study
The patient cohort included 2,776 hospital inpatients and 
15,218 ED patients; the number of individual dialysis pa-
tients could not be determined. Among these, we identified 
50 cohort study cases; these 50 patients had a median 6.5 
days (interquartile range 5.0–11.0 days) of KFGH treat-
ment during the 2–14 days before symptom onset (when 
they were susceptible); 41 of the 50 continued to be treated 
at KFGH (for a median of 12 days) in the 14 days after 
symptom onset, when they could have infected other pa-
tients (Figure 2). When we looked for MERS exposures 
outside of KFGH among the 50, we found that 1 had an 
outpatient contact with a known MERS patient and 1 had 
been admitted to a different hospital for a non-MERS ill-
ness. When we looked for documented opportunities for 
patient-to-patient transmission, we found that only 2 MERS 
patients were known to have been in the same room as an 
infectious patient while hospitalized at KFGH. Thirty-two 
of the cohort study MERS patients were exposed to only 1 
setting in the 2–14 days before symptom onset; of these, 14 
(44%) were exposed only to the ED, 10 (31%) to inpatient 
areas, and 8 (25%) to the dialysis unit. When all 50 were 
categorized according to the probable site of acquisition, 
acquisition was attributed to the ED for 22 (44%), inpatient 
areas for 17 (34%), and the dialysis unit for 11 (22%). In 
sensitivity analyses, varying the mean incubation from 5.2 
to 6.8 days, the number of cases probably acquired in the 
ED varied from 20 to 23 and in the inpatient area from 16 to 
19; the number did not change for the dialysis unit.
Overall MERS incidence during the outbreak period 
was 6.1 cases/10,000 patient-days and was similar (range 
5.3–6.5 cases/10,000 patient-days) for the ED, inpatient 
area, and dialysis unit (Table 5). Incidence was substan-
tially higher during outbreak weeks 5–7 (March 30–April 
19; rate 10.3–29.4 cases/10,000 patient-days) than during 
other weeks (0–4.2/10,000 patient-days) (Figure 3). The 
incidence rate was higher for non-Saudis than for Saudi 
nationals (10.1 vs. 4.5 cases/10,000 patient-days; p = 0.01) 
and for older persons (40–59 and >60 years, rates 19.1 
and 17.4/10,000 patient-days, respectively) than younger 
persons (0–19 and 20–39 years, rates 2.4 and 5.9/10,000 
patient-days, respectively). The illness rate was higher for 
male than for female persons, but the difference was not 
statistically significant.
Per 10,000 patient-days, the maximum-likelihood 
model estimates of incidence rates were 6.4 (95% CI 3.0–
9.8) for the ED, 6.2 (95% CI 2.3–10.1) for inpatient areas, 
and 5.5 (95% CI 1.5–9.5) for the dialysis unit; by using di-
alysis as the reference category, risk ratios were 1.16 (95% 
CI 0.45–4.45) for the ED and 1.14 (95% CI 0.36–4.29) for 
inpatient ares (online Technical Appendix). These values 
were similar to, and confirmed, results obtained by using 
the most probable site of acquisition.
Hemodialysis Unit Study
Of the 50 cohort study case-patients, 22 were dialysis pa-
tients. Of the 22, the most likely site of acquisition was the 
dialysis unit for 11, the ED for 7, and inpatient areas for 
4. Three of the 11 with dialysis unit acquisition had been 
dialyzed 2–14 days before their MERS onset in the same 
dialysis unit section and same shift as an infectious patient. 
For the 11 with dialysis unit acquisition, the patient-day 
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Table 3. MERS	cases	potentially	acquired	at	KFGH,	Jeddah,	Saudi	Arabia,	March	2–May	10,	2014* 
Category No.	(%)	cases Patient	median	age,	y No.	(%) male patients  
All	KFGH-acquired cases 78	(100.0) 53 59	(75.6) 
Acquisition category    
 Cohort	study	case-patient† 50	(64.1) 56 37	(74.0) 
 Healthcare	worker	at	KFGH 16	(20.5) 47 12	(75.0) 
 Visited	patient	treated	at	KFGH 9	(11.5) 47 8	(88.9) 
 Outpatient	appointment	at	KFGH 3	(3.8) 59 2	(66.7) 
*Cases	were	categorized	as	potentially	KFGH-acquired	for	persons	who	had	KFGH	contact	before	MERS	onset.	KFGH,	King	Fahd	General	Hospital;	
MERS,	Middle	East	respiratory	syndrome. 
†Patients with MERS onset 2‒14 days after emergency department, inpatient, or dialysis treatment at KFGH. Includes 3 healthcare workers  
(1 who worked at KFGH and 2 at other hospitals) who were admitted to KFGH inpatient areas or emergency department 2‒14 days	before	MERS	onset. 
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incidence was not significantly higher in any of the 4 dialy-
sis unit sections than in others (data not shown).
Infection Control Evaluation
Early in the study period, ED patients were treated in 1 of 
5 rooms, according to illness acuity. The ED was typically 
crowded, with patient gurneys nearly touching one another; 
no system for triaging and isolating patients with respira-
tory diseases was available, and patients often remained 
in the ED for multiple days under the care of admitting 
service physicians. During epidemic week 6 (April 6–12), 
KFGH implemented a system of aggressive ED triaging to 
separate patients with respiratory symptoms from other ED 
patients. Patient census in the ED decreased (Figure 3), en-
abling increased separation of patient gurneys.
The HCWs in the ED and intensive care unit were 
screened for MERS-CoV with RT-PCR (number screened 
unknown). Fourteen were positive and isolated at home; 
13 of these remained asymptomatic and returned to work 
when they became RT-PCR negative (these 13 were not 
included as cases because they were asymptomatic). One 
positive HCW became ill while in home isolation, was hos-
pitalized, and is included among the 78 cases.
Before the outbreak, MERS inpatients were isolat-
ed or cohorted in standard patient rooms, but infection 
control adherence was reportedly incomplete. Starting 
in week 8 (April 20–26), inpatients with known or sus-
pected MERS were treated in 1 of 17 single-patient neg-
ative-pressure isolation rooms in a new hospital building; 
visitors were not allowed in patient rooms. Also during 
week 8, KFGH was designated a MERS treatment facil-
ity and began accepting transfers of MERS patients from 
other Jeddah hospitals. Starting May 9, KFGH leadership 
made additional changes, including implementation of 
a new MOH infection prevention and control guideline 
and management algorithm (16,17) that included a hos-
pital-based clinical guideline with detailed procedures for 
treating MERS patients. Transport pathways, elevators, 
a radiograph room, and a resuscitation room were desig-
nated for MERS patient use.
Before the outbreak, dialysis was performed 24 
hours/day during 6 days/week. During week 8 (April 20–
26), after a visit from Saudi MOH officials, changes were 
made: dialysis was reduced from 4 to 3 shifts per day, 
space between patients was increased to a minimum of 
1.2 m, and use of personal protective equipment (gowns, 
gloves, and surgical masks) among HCWs was required. 
None of the dialysis unit HCWs developed MERS during 
the outbreak period.
Discussion
Our results suggest that 78 persons (53 patients, 16 
HCWs, 9 visitors) became symptomatically infected 
with MERS at KFGH during spring 2014. Among the pa-
tients, infection was acquired in multiple settings, includ-
ing the ED (22 cases), inpatient areas (17 cases), outpa-
tient dialysis unit (11 cases), and other outpatient areas 
(3 cases). We were able to directly track transmission 
(i.e., an infectious and a susceptible patient in the same 
room) only to 5 cases: 2 in inpatient areas and 3 in the 
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Table 4. Middle	East	respiratory	syndrome	coronavirus	infections	
among employees, King	Fahd	General	Hospital,	Jeddah,	Saudi	
Arabia,	March	2–May	10,	2014 
Personnel	category 
No.	
employees 
No.	cases	(incidence*),	
n	=	16 
Physician 958 10	(1.0) 
Nurse 1,260 2	(0.2) 
Technician 665 0 
Administrator 515 1	(0.2) 
Pharmacist 21 0 
Maintenance	or	
housekeeping 
1,295 1	(0.1) 
Other or unknown † 2 
*Per	100	employees. 
†Total number of King Fahd General Hospital personnel in this category  
is unknown. 
 
Figure 2.	Middle	East	respiratory	
syndrome cases acquired at 
King	Fahd	General	Hospital,	
by date of symptom onset, 
Jeddah,	Saudi	Arabia,	March	
2–May	10,	2014.The	78	patients	
comprised	50	cohort	study	
cases,	16	healthcare	workers,	9	
visitors,	and	3	outpatients.	ED,	
emergency department.
MERS-CoV,	Saudi	Arabia
dialysis unit. However, most of these persons had several 
days (median 6.5) of treatment in KFGH before MERS 
onset (Figure 1), strongly suggesting that they acquired 
MERS at KFGH. In addition, we were able to determine 
setting-specific infection rates and found that they were 
similar in the ED, inpatient areas, and dialysis unit, in-
dicating that risk for acquisition was widespread. Treat-
ment in >1 setting of many of these patients complicated 
determination of these setting-specific rates. However, 
the 2 methods we used to overcome this problem, most 
likely site of acquisition and maximum-likelihood model-
ing, provided good agreement.
In previous MERS outbreaks, dialysis units have been 
implicated as a focus of disease transmission. At KFGH the 
patient-day risk for transmission in the dialysis unit was no 
greater than in the KFGH ED and inpatient areas; only 11 
of the 22 cohort patients receiving dialysis were believed to 
have acquired MERS in the dialysis unit.
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Table 5. Retrospective	cohort	study	of	risk	factors	for	Middle	East	respiratory	syndrome	coronavirus	infection	acquired	at	King	Fahd	
General	Hospital,	Jeddah,	Saudi	Arabia,	March	2–May	10,	2014 
Population	or	variable No.	cases No.	patient-days Rate* Rate	ratio p value 
Emergency department, inpatient areas, dialysis unit† 50 81,987 6.1   
 Setting      
  Emergency department 22 34,897 6.3 1.2 0.64 
  Inpatient areas 17 26,186 6.5 1.2 0.60 
  Dialysis unit 11 20,904 5.3 Referent  
 Outbreak	week:	start	date      
  1:	March	2 1 8,609 1.2 Referent  
  2:	March	9 0 11,136 0.0 Referent  
  3:	March	16 2 11,437 1.7 Referent  
  4:	March	23 5 11,793 4.2 4.4 0.047 
  5:	March	30 11 10,666 10.3 10.7 <0.001 
  6:	April	6 20 6,805 29.4 30.5 <0.001 
  7:	April	13 8 5,654 14.2 14.7 <0.001 
  8:	April	20 1 5,333 1.9 1.9 0.57 
  9:	April	27 2 5,509 3.6 3.8 0.19 
  10:	May	4 0 5,047 0.0 0.0 0.63 
Emergency department, hospital inpatient areas‡ 39 61,083 6.4   
 Nationality      
  Saudi 18 40,384 4.5 Referent  
  Non-Saudi 21 20,698 10.1 2.3 0.01 
 Sex      
  F 10 21,897 4.6 Referent  
  M 29 39,151 7.4 1.6 0.18 
 Age group, y      
  0–19 8 33,005 2.4 Referent  
  20–39 10 16,888 5.9 2.4 0.064 
  40–59 18 9,400 19.1 7.9 <0.001 
  >60 3 1,725 17.4 7.2 0.016 
*Per	10,000	patient-days. 
†For these analyses, cases were attributed to the setting or week that was most probable on the basis of incubation period (Tables	1,	2);	p	values	do	not	
reflect uncertainty caused by these attributions. 
‡Denominator data for dialysis patients	was	not	available;	dialysis	patients	are	not	included	in	these	analyses. 
 
Figure 3.	Number	of	Middle	East	
respiratory syndrome cases, 
incidence rate, and number of 
patient-days	of	treatment	at	King	
Fahd	General	Hospital,	Jeddah,	
Saudi	Arabia,	March	2–June	14,	
2014.	Incidence	rate	is	cases	
per	100,000	patient-days.	ED,	
emergency department. 
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Although MERS incidence rates were similar in the 
ED, inpatient areas, and dialysis unit, the ED was the 
most frequently implicated in disease acquisition among 
patients. Contributing factors probably included lack 
of triage, lack of isolation for patients with respiratory 
symptoms, extended stays for certain patients, and close 
proximity among patients. The KFGH outbreak peaked 
during week 6 and decreased sharply after week 7 (Figures 
2, 3) after infection control improvements in the ED during 
week 6. During week 8, infection control was improved 
in the dialysis unit, and a MERS unit was established in 
a separate building. These improvements, in combination 
with decreased patient volume by week 6, probably led to 
decreased transmission.
The median onset date for KFGH-acquired MERS-
CoV infection (April 11) was ≈2 weeks before that of cases 
that were not KFGH-acquired (April 22) and 1 week before 
all symptomatic cases in Jeddah (US Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, unpub. data). Thus, as indicated in 
a recent laboratory-based study (15), KFGH appears to have 
been an early focus of transmission in the Jeddah outbreak. 
Our cohort study reported higher incidence among older 
patients at KFGH, suggesting that clinically recognized 
disease did not develop in certain younger patients who 
were exposed to MERS-CoV infection at KFGH. Although 
we did not study HCW-to-patient transmission, asymptom-
atic HCWs were documented and might have contributed 
to disease transmission. The potential for transmission by 
asymptomatic persons needs further investigation.
Limitations to this study include incomplete clinical 
data for patients and for HCWs. In certain instances, we 
had to use clinical judgement to estimate disease onset 
dates. No records were kept on ED rooms in which patients 
were treated. Although we attempted to identify all non-
KFGH healthcare exposures, certain exposures might not 
have been identified. We assumed that patients treated at 
KFGH at any time during the 2–14 days before illness on-
set had potentially KFGH-acquired disease. Records were 
not uniformly available when patients from other dialysis 
units or from the ED were dialyzed temporarily at KFGH; 
our results might not reflect disease transmitted from, or 
acquired by, these patients. The number of dialysis patient-
days of treatment could only be estimated. Finally, data on 
genetic typing of MERS-CoV viruses from KFGH cases 
that could have helped define chains of transmission was 
not available to us.
In conclusion, the MERS outbreak at KFGH affected 
patients and HCWs. Illness most likely was transmitted in 
multiple settings, making it difficult to track disease from 
patient-to-patient. The contribution to MERS-CoV trans-
mission at KFGH by asymptomatic persons is uncertain; 
transmission by asymptomatic persons is an area that needs 
further study. Heightened awareness of MERS, aggressive 
triaging of patients, prompt isolation, and strict infection 
control measures were associated with a rapid decrease in 
transmission. Continued vigilance and consistent adher-
ence to infection control precautions is necessary to pre-
vent future healthcare-acquired MERS outbreaks.
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